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Auteurs principaux: Golemanov, Tzanko, GOLEMANOVA, EMILIA
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Publié: Zenodo 2025
Accès en ligne:https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18362019
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author Golemanov, Tzanko
GOLEMANOVA, EMILIA
author_facet Golemanov, Tzanko
GOLEMANOVA, EMILIA
contents <p><strong><span lang="EN-US">Abstract</span></strong><span lang="EN-US">—<span lang="EN-US">Designing secure electronic voting systems involves balancing ballot secrecy, universal verifiability, and coercion resistance. Traditional cryptographic approaches often treat these requirements as mutually exclusive, limiting recoverability to preserve anonymity. Arcaunt introduces a hybrid remote</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">voting architecture that addresses these constraints by combining randomized, offline physical credential distribution with an Anonymous Recovery Channel (ARC). ARC enables voters to autonomously revoke and replace compromised tokens without revealing personally identifiable information, avoiding the persistent identity linkage present in systems such as Estonia’s IVXV. A security analysis under a modified Dolev–Yao model indicates resilience against coercion, insider attacks, client</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">side compromise, and vote</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">selling incentives. Arcaunt supports revoting integrity through SHA</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">3 hashing, elliptic</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">curve signatures, and zero-knowledge proofs that validate ballot supersession without exposing voter identities. The dual</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">ledger design</span><span lang="EN-US">—</span><span lang="EN-US">an anonymous public commitment ledger paired with a protected temporal ledger</span><span lang="EN-US">—</span><span lang="EN-US">supports universal auditability while preserving privacy, and integrates randomized verification windows to thwart real</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">time coercion monitoring. Performance evaluation indicates that credential generation, ledger validation, and revote processing scale to national deployments. A ten</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">year economic model projects over 85% cost reduction compared to paper</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">based elections. A functional web prototype is under development to assess usability, ARC workflow robustness, and real</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">world performance. Arcaunt establishes a practical, coercion</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">resistant, and economically viable foundation for large</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">scale digital democracy.</span></span></p> <p><strong><span lang="EN-US">Keywords</span></strong><span lang="EN-US">—e-voting, arcaunt, anonymous recovery channel (arc), coercion resistance, sha-3, digital democracy, govtech, zero-knowledge proofs.</span></p>
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spellingShingle Arcaunt: A Scalable, Coercion-Resistant, and Accountable E-Voting Architecture via Anonymous Recovery Channels
Golemanov, Tzanko
GOLEMANOVA, EMILIA
<p><strong><span lang="EN-US">Abstract</span></strong><span lang="EN-US">—<span lang="EN-US">Designing secure electronic voting systems involves balancing ballot secrecy, universal verifiability, and coercion resistance. Traditional cryptographic approaches often treat these requirements as mutually exclusive, limiting recoverability to preserve anonymity. Arcaunt introduces a hybrid remote</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">voting architecture that addresses these constraints by combining randomized, offline physical credential distribution with an Anonymous Recovery Channel (ARC). ARC enables voters to autonomously revoke and replace compromised tokens without revealing personally identifiable information, avoiding the persistent identity linkage present in systems such as Estonia’s IVXV. A security analysis under a modified Dolev–Yao model indicates resilience against coercion, insider attacks, client</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">side compromise, and vote</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">selling incentives. Arcaunt supports revoting integrity through SHA</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">3 hashing, elliptic</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">curve signatures, and zero-knowledge proofs that validate ballot supersession without exposing voter identities. The dual</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">ledger design</span><span lang="EN-US">—</span><span lang="EN-US">an anonymous public commitment ledger paired with a protected temporal ledger</span><span lang="EN-US">—</span><span lang="EN-US">supports universal auditability while preserving privacy, and integrates randomized verification windows to thwart real</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">time coercion monitoring. Performance evaluation indicates that credential generation, ledger validation, and revote processing scale to national deployments. A ten</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">year economic model projects over 85% cost reduction compared to paper</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">based elections. A functional web prototype is under development to assess usability, ARC workflow robustness, and real</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">world performance. Arcaunt establishes a practical, coercion</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">resistant, and economically viable foundation for large</span><span lang="EN-US">‑</span><span lang="EN-US">scale digital democracy.</span></span></p> <p><strong><span lang="EN-US">Keywords</span></strong><span lang="EN-US">—e-voting, arcaunt, anonymous recovery channel (arc), coercion resistance, sha-3, digital democracy, govtech, zero-knowledge proofs.</span></p>
title Arcaunt: A Scalable, Coercion-Resistant, and Accountable E-Voting Architecture via Anonymous Recovery Channels
url https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18362019