Toward a Multi-Perspective Ontology of Constitutional Adjudication: Overcoming the Single-Light Limitation in Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law

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contents <p>This preprint proposes a structural reformulation of constitutional adjudication by introducing the “Light–Shadow Principle,” a multi-perspective framework that explains the inherent limitations of single-source legal theories. Building on Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, the paper demonstrates that any mono-perspectival normative system inevitably generates blind spots (“shadows”) that cannot be resolved within its own conceptual boundaries.</p> <p>Through a synthesis of legal theory, cognitive science, and systems analysis, the study shows that constitutional reasoning becomes structurally more stable when multiple interpretive perspectives (“light sources”) are integrated. This approach does not negate the contributions of past philosophers or jurists; rather, it situates their insights as partial illuminations within a broader epistemic architecture.</p> <p>The paper argues that contemporary shifts in scholarly communication—such as the increasing acceptance of diverse research formats on platforms like Zenodo, OSF, and SSRN—empirically validate the need for multi-perspective models in legal and philosophical inquiry. By offering a unified structural explanation for both historical limitations and modern institutional changes, the work provides a timely foundation for rethinking constitutional adjudication as a multi-source, dynamically stable system.</p>
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spellingShingle Toward a Multi-Perspective Ontology of Constitutional Adjudication: Overcoming the Single-Light Limitation in Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law
STUDENT, By
Multi-Perspective Ontology
Constitutional Adjudication
Light–Shadow Principle
Pure Theory of Law
Hans Kelsen
Structural Blind Spots
Legal Epistemology
Systems Theory in Law
Judicial Reasoning Models
Pluralistic Legal Frameworks
<p>This preprint proposes a structural reformulation of constitutional adjudication by introducing the “Light–Shadow Principle,” a multi-perspective framework that explains the inherent limitations of single-source legal theories. Building on Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, the paper demonstrates that any mono-perspectival normative system inevitably generates blind spots (“shadows”) that cannot be resolved within its own conceptual boundaries.</p> <p>Through a synthesis of legal theory, cognitive science, and systems analysis, the study shows that constitutional reasoning becomes structurally more stable when multiple interpretive perspectives (“light sources”) are integrated. This approach does not negate the contributions of past philosophers or jurists; rather, it situates their insights as partial illuminations within a broader epistemic architecture.</p> <p>The paper argues that contemporary shifts in scholarly communication—such as the increasing acceptance of diverse research formats on platforms like Zenodo, OSF, and SSRN—empirically validate the need for multi-perspective models in legal and philosophical inquiry. By offering a unified structural explanation for both historical limitations and modern institutional changes, the work provides a timely foundation for rethinking constitutional adjudication as a multi-source, dynamically stable system.</p>
title Toward a Multi-Perspective Ontology of Constitutional Adjudication: Overcoming the Single-Light Limitation in Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law
topic Multi-Perspective Ontology
Constitutional Adjudication
Light–Shadow Principle
Pure Theory of Law
Hans Kelsen
Structural Blind Spots
Legal Epistemology
Systems Theory in Law
Judicial Reasoning Models
Pluralistic Legal Frameworks
url https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18400285