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| Format: | Recurso digital |
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Zenodo
2026
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18514602 |
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Table of Contents:
- <p>This paper reclassifies probability as a <strong>standing-preserving bookkeeping device</strong> rather than as an ontic feature of reality or a measure of epistemic belief. It argues that probabilistic formalisms arise when admissible reference must be maintained across ensembles, uncertainty, or representational compression, not because the world itself is fundamentally probabilistic.</p> <p>Within a closed admissibility framework, probabilities function to coordinate descriptions under limited resolution, incomplete specification, or non-selective access. They do not describe propensities, chances, or degrees of belief, nor do they license claims about indeterminacy in underlying processes. When probability is treated as ontic randomness or epistemic likelihood, representational necessity is illicitly promoted into metaphysical or epistemic commitment.</p> <p>The analysis is eliminative rather than reconstructive. No alternative probability theory is proposed, and no interpretive stance—frequentist, Bayesian, or otherwise—is endorsed. Instead, the paper establishes a boundary condition: probabilistic statements are admissible only insofar as they preserve standing across admissible descriptions without asserting additional structure about reality or knowledge.</p> <p>By situating probability alongside other standing-preserving bookkeeping regimes, the paper dissolves long-standing disputes over the meaning and status of probability. It closes these debates by showing that the contested interpretations arise from category errors about what probability is permitted to do within an admissible representational framework.</p>