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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Recurso digital |
| Language: | |
| Published: |
Zenodo
2026
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18517044 |
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Table of Contents:
- <p><strong><span lang="EN-US">Abstract</span></strong><span lang="EN-US">—</span></p> <p><span lang="EN-US">Remote electronic voting promises increased accessibility but remains constrained by persistent challenges related to coercion in unsupervised environments, credential compromise, and the difficulty of sustaining long-term voter trust. While coercion-resistant approaches commonly rely on revoting, most existing systems treat credential loss or recovery as an administrative exception, often reintroducing identity linkage or trusted intermediaries and offering limited means for voters or observers to verify that an election unfolded as intended. This paper presents Arcaunt, a remote voting architecture that elevates anonymous credential recovery to a first-class security property and integrates it directly into the voting lifecycle. The architecture introduces an Anonymous Recovery Channel (ARC), enabling voters to revoke and replace compromised credentials without identity disclosure or reliance on administrator discretion. Recovery is logically and operationally decoupled from ballot casting. This preserves ballot secrecy and prevents temporary compromise of credentials, devices, or voter autonomy from becoming a permanent loss of voting control. Arcaunt builds on established cryptographic mechanisms, including publicly verifiable bulletin boards, commitment-based ballots, and unlinkable bearer credentials. These components provide ballot integrity and verifiability without exposing voter identities and form the foundation on which revoting, recovery, and auditability are composed. Individual assurance is provided through deferred, non-transferable verification mechanisms: voters receive a receipt at ballot submission, while verification becomes possible only after election closure, preventing real-time feedback that could enable coercion while still allowing voters to confirm that their final valid ballot was recorded and included. At the system level, integrity is enforced through an append-only, publicly auditable ledger and deterministic “last valid vote” counting rules, ensuring that administrative database access cannot alter election outcomes without detection. The architecture explicitly bounds its threat model, acknowledging limits against global traffic analysis and continuous coercion while constraining failures to be temporary and non-scalable. We analyze the security properties of the proposed system under realistic adversarial assumptions and evaluate a prototype implementation, demonstrating that anonymous recovery, coercion-resistant revoting, individual verification, and public auditability can be combined efficiently without reliance on trusted administrators or specialized hardware.</span></p> <p><strong><span lang="EN-US">Keywords</span></strong><span lang="EN-US">—e-voting, arcaunt, anonymous recovery channel (arc), coercion resistance, sha-3, digital democracy, govtech, zero-knowledge proofs.</span></p>