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Main Author: Maley, Amos
Format: Recurso digital
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Published: Zenodo 2026
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18519100
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author Maley, Amos
author_facet Maley, Amos
contents <p>This paper establishes <strong>standing</strong> as a necessary condition for admissible reasoning in artificial epistemic agents and proves its strict equivalence to admissibility under fail-closed evaluation. It shows that agents lacking standing cannot produce meaningful, reference-grounded claims, regardless of internal coherence, learning capacity, or optimization success. The analysis is necessity-based and exhaustion-driven: all proposed alternatives to standing (probabilistic validation, performance metrics, post-hoc justification, governance overlays, or repair strategies) are shown to fail structurally. No algorithms or construction procedures are provided. The result is a binary boundary on what counts as a legitimate epistemic agent and a foundational constraint on artificial reasoning systems.</p>
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publishDate 2026
publisher Zenodo
record_format zenodo
spellingShingle Admissibility and Standing in Artificial Epistemic Agents
Maley, Amos
<p>This paper establishes <strong>standing</strong> as a necessary condition for admissible reasoning in artificial epistemic agents and proves its strict equivalence to admissibility under fail-closed evaluation. It shows that agents lacking standing cannot produce meaningful, reference-grounded claims, regardless of internal coherence, learning capacity, or optimization success. The analysis is necessity-based and exhaustion-driven: all proposed alternatives to standing (probabilistic validation, performance metrics, post-hoc justification, governance overlays, or repair strategies) are shown to fail structurally. No algorithms or construction procedures are provided. The result is a binary boundary on what counts as a legitimate epistemic agent and a foundational constraint on artificial reasoning systems.</p>
title Admissibility and Standing in Artificial Epistemic Agents
url https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18519100