WHY NO EMPIRICAL RESULT CAN REFUTE LORENTZIAN ADMISSIBILITY
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866901459357925376 |
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| author | Maley, Amos |
| author_facet | Maley, Amos |
| contents | <div> <div> <div> <div> <div dir="auto"> <div> <div> <p>This paper establishes a negative boundary condition on empirical refutation in physics. It proves that Lorentzian admissibility cannot be overturned by any empirical result, regardless of precision, novelty, or apparent anomaly, because Lorentzian structure is a precondition for admissible empirical reference rather than a hypothesis within empirical competition.</p> <p>The argument is eliminative and modal. The paper does not deny the possibility of experimental surprises, novel phenomena, or the revision of physical theories. Instead, it shows that any empirical result capable of counting as evidence already presupposes Lorentzian reference conditions in order to be stated, compared, and confirmed. Attempts to refute Lorentzian admissibility therefore rely on the very structure they aim to reject, resulting in structural incoherence rather than empirical disconfirmation.</p> <p>The analysis blocks a broad class of arguments that appeal to superluminal effects, preferred frames, modified kinematics, or exotic spacetime proposals as empirical counterexamples. It demonstrates that such proposals either collapse into inadmissible reference schemes or covertly reinstate Lorentzian structure at the level of empirical attribution.</p> <p>This work is purely boundary-setting. It introduces no new primitives, no alternative spacetime models, and no operational or enforcement procedures. Its contribution is to clarify the limits of empirical refutation, distinguishing between revisable physical theories and non-negotiable conditions of empirical intelligibility itself.</p> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div> </div> <div> <div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div> </div> |
| format | Recurso digital |
| id | zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_18531515 |
| institution | Zenodo |
| language | |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| publisher | Zenodo |
| record_format | zenodo |
| spellingShingle | WHY NO EMPIRICAL RESULT CAN REFUTE LORENTZIAN ADMISSIBILITY Maley, Amos Physics Physics Particle physics Quantum physics Theoretical physics <div> <div> <div> <div> <div dir="auto"> <div> <div> <p>This paper establishes a negative boundary condition on empirical refutation in physics. It proves that Lorentzian admissibility cannot be overturned by any empirical result, regardless of precision, novelty, or apparent anomaly, because Lorentzian structure is a precondition for admissible empirical reference rather than a hypothesis within empirical competition.</p> <p>The argument is eliminative and modal. The paper does not deny the possibility of experimental surprises, novel phenomena, or the revision of physical theories. Instead, it shows that any empirical result capable of counting as evidence already presupposes Lorentzian reference conditions in order to be stated, compared, and confirmed. Attempts to refute Lorentzian admissibility therefore rely on the very structure they aim to reject, resulting in structural incoherence rather than empirical disconfirmation.</p> <p>The analysis blocks a broad class of arguments that appeal to superluminal effects, preferred frames, modified kinematics, or exotic spacetime proposals as empirical counterexamples. It demonstrates that such proposals either collapse into inadmissible reference schemes or covertly reinstate Lorentzian structure at the level of empirical attribution.</p> <p>This work is purely boundary-setting. It introduces no new primitives, no alternative spacetime models, and no operational or enforcement procedures. Its contribution is to clarify the limits of empirical refutation, distinguishing between revisable physical theories and non-negotiable conditions of empirical intelligibility itself.</p> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div> </div> <div> <div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> <div> </div> |
| title | WHY NO EMPIRICAL RESULT CAN REFUTE LORENTZIAN ADMISSIBILITY |
| topic | Physics Physics Particle physics Quantum physics Theoretical physics |
| url | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18531515 |