| _version_ | 1866901977265340416 |
|---|---|
| author | Kaminskyi, Igor |
| author_facet | Kaminskyi, Igor |
| contents | <p lang="en-US"><span><span><span><span><span lang="en-US">Recent neuroscientific experiments have fundamentally revised classical conceptions of consciousness, free will, and human agency. Beginning with the pioneering work of </span></span></span><u><a><span><span>Benjamin Libet</span></span></a></u><span><span><span lang="en-US"> and extended by subsequent studies conducted by </span></span></span><u><a><span><span><span lang="en-US">Patrick Haggard</span></span></span></a></u><span><span>, </span></span><u><a><span><span>John-Dylan Haynes</span></span></a></u><span><span>, </span></span><u><a><span><span><span lang="de-DE">Aaron Schurger</span></span></span></a></u><span><span><span lang="en-US">, and others, empirical evidence has consistently demonstrated that the initiation of voluntary action precedes the conscious awareness of intention. These findings directly undermine the classical philosophical model in which consciousness is treated as the primary source of decision-making, choice, and moral responsibility.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p lang="en-US"> </p> <p lang="en-US"><span><span><span><span lang="en-US">Importantly, these experimental results do not merely refine existing theoretical frameworks but render untenable a broad intellectual tradition encompassing Cartesian dualism, Kantian autonomy of the will, and rationalist and existentialist accounts of freedom as an originating act of consciousness. Within contemporary neuroscientific models, consciousness no longer appears as the driving force of behavior but rather as a temporally delayed integrative layer that becomes active only after the initiation of action-related neural processes. Crucially, however, this temporal delay delineates a functional window within which an incipient action may still be inhibited, as demonstrated in studies of voluntary veto and motor suppression.</span></span></span></span></p> <p lang="en-US"> </p> <p lang="en-US"><span><span><span><span lang="en-US">This paper introduces the authorial concept of Dominanta X, defined as a temporal architecture of awareness that functions as a neuroethical firewall between precognitive automatism and behavioral execution. Dominanta X does not initiate impulses; instead, it enables their suspension, redirection, or cancellation. The initiating automatism itself is structured by cognitive implants—deep, preconceptual matrices of behavioral availability that determine which impulses can emerge and dominate prior to conscious access.</span></span></span></span></p> <p lang="en-US"> </p> <p lang="en-US"><span><span><span><span lang="en-US">It is argued that the capacity to delay action constitutes a genuine evolutionary advantage in humans. This capacity allows the system to hold conflicting impulses, simulate consequences without immediate bodily execution, and engage in anti-instinctive forms of behavior under conditions of social and technological complexity. In this sense, the human being may be regarded as an evolutionary vanguard not due to superior computational intelligence, but owing to a fragile and energetically costly mechanism of temporal self-inhibition.</span></span></span></span></p> <p lang="en-US"> </p> <p lang="en-US"><span><span><span><span lang="en-US">In conclusion, the paper examines contemporary technological pressures that systematically erode this function of consciousness and substantiates the necessity of cognitive firewalls—diagnostic (ICE) and neuroethical (ICE</span>–N)<span lang="en-US">—aimed at preserving the evolutionary role of consciousness under conditions of increasing automation.</span></span></span></span></p> |
| format | Recurso digital |
| id | zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_18611397 |
| institution | Zenodo |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| publisher | Zenodo |
| record_format | zenodo |
| spellingShingle | The Evolutionary Advantage of the Human Mind Kaminskyi, Igor Dominanta X; consciousness; free will; temporal delay; cognitive implants; neuroethics; ICE; ICE–N; HUMP; Libet experiment; action inhibition <p lang="en-US"><span><span><span><span><span lang="en-US">Recent neuroscientific experiments have fundamentally revised classical conceptions of consciousness, free will, and human agency. Beginning with the pioneering work of </span></span></span><u><a><span><span>Benjamin Libet</span></span></a></u><span><span><span lang="en-US"> and extended by subsequent studies conducted by </span></span></span><u><a><span><span><span lang="en-US">Patrick Haggard</span></span></span></a></u><span><span>, </span></span><u><a><span><span>John-Dylan Haynes</span></span></a></u><span><span>, </span></span><u><a><span><span><span lang="de-DE">Aaron Schurger</span></span></span></a></u><span><span><span lang="en-US">, and others, empirical evidence has consistently demonstrated that the initiation of voluntary action precedes the conscious awareness of intention. These findings directly undermine the classical philosophical model in which consciousness is treated as the primary source of decision-making, choice, and moral responsibility.</span></span></span></span></span></p> <p lang="en-US"> </p> <p lang="en-US"><span><span><span><span lang="en-US">Importantly, these experimental results do not merely refine existing theoretical frameworks but render untenable a broad intellectual tradition encompassing Cartesian dualism, Kantian autonomy of the will, and rationalist and existentialist accounts of freedom as an originating act of consciousness. Within contemporary neuroscientific models, consciousness no longer appears as the driving force of behavior but rather as a temporally delayed integrative layer that becomes active only after the initiation of action-related neural processes. Crucially, however, this temporal delay delineates a functional window within which an incipient action may still be inhibited, as demonstrated in studies of voluntary veto and motor suppression.</span></span></span></span></p> <p lang="en-US"> </p> <p lang="en-US"><span><span><span><span lang="en-US">This paper introduces the authorial concept of Dominanta X, defined as a temporal architecture of awareness that functions as a neuroethical firewall between precognitive automatism and behavioral execution. Dominanta X does not initiate impulses; instead, it enables their suspension, redirection, or cancellation. The initiating automatism itself is structured by cognitive implants—deep, preconceptual matrices of behavioral availability that determine which impulses can emerge and dominate prior to conscious access.</span></span></span></span></p> <p lang="en-US"> </p> <p lang="en-US"><span><span><span><span lang="en-US">It is argued that the capacity to delay action constitutes a genuine evolutionary advantage in humans. This capacity allows the system to hold conflicting impulses, simulate consequences without immediate bodily execution, and engage in anti-instinctive forms of behavior under conditions of social and technological complexity. In this sense, the human being may be regarded as an evolutionary vanguard not due to superior computational intelligence, but owing to a fragile and energetically costly mechanism of temporal self-inhibition.</span></span></span></span></p> <p lang="en-US"> </p> <p lang="en-US"><span><span><span><span lang="en-US">In conclusion, the paper examines contemporary technological pressures that systematically erode this function of consciousness and substantiates the necessity of cognitive firewalls—diagnostic (ICE) and neuroethical (ICE</span>–N)<span lang="en-US">—aimed at preserving the evolutionary role of consciousness under conditions of increasing automation.</span></span></span></span></p> |
| title | The Evolutionary Advantage of the Human Mind |
| topic | Dominanta X; consciousness; free will; temporal delay; cognitive implants; neuroethics; ICE; ICE–N; HUMP; Libet experiment; action inhibition |
| url | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18611397 |