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Dettagli Bibliografici
Autore principale: Kumaki, Rei
Natura: Recurso digital
Lingua:inglese
Pubblicazione: Zenodo 2026
Soggetti:
Accesso online:https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18693496
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Sommario:
  • <p><strong>Preprint v1.1.</strong> This paper develops a formal model of institutional gate pressure in sleep-related medical markets. We show how insurer-imposed diagnostic thresholds induce avoidance behavior that suppresses medical record formation, generating endogenous information distortion and risk inversion.</p><p>The model identifies institutional observability thresholds at which diagnostic incentives flip sign and long-run actuarial calibration deteriorates.</p><p>This framework contributes to insurance economics, health economics, and institutional information design.</p>