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Zenodo
2026
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18959911 |
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| _version_ | 1866901540485201920 |
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| author | Hocine, Elhadj |
| author_facet | Hocine, Elhadj |
| contents | <p>Non-deterministic computation—whether from neural networks, speculative execution, or legacy system architectures—inevitably leaks information via timing side-channels, bypassing cryptographic isolation and air gaps. We propose a hardware-enforced containment architecture, Project BLACKBODY, which treats the compute node as a high-entropy thermodynamic source.</p> <p>By interposing a unidirectional, isochronous Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) governor between the secure zone and the operator, we physically clamp the channel capacity (C) to ≤ 1200 bits per second. We demonstrate through information theory that limiting the rate of information egress below the human cognitive processing threshold mathematically bounds the system's "Agency" (α), rendering high-velocity exfiltration, covert timing attacks, and real-time manipulation thermodynamically impossible.</p> |
| format | Recurso digital |
| id | zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_18959911 |
| institution | Zenodo |
| language | |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| publisher | Zenodo |
| record_format | zenodo |
| spellingShingle | Physical-Layer Containment via Isochronous Governors: An Information-Theoretic Side-Channel Countermeasure Hocine, Elhadj <p>Non-deterministic computation—whether from neural networks, speculative execution, or legacy system architectures—inevitably leaks information via timing side-channels, bypassing cryptographic isolation and air gaps. We propose a hardware-enforced containment architecture, Project BLACKBODY, which treats the compute node as a high-entropy thermodynamic source.</p> <p>By interposing a unidirectional, isochronous Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) governor between the secure zone and the operator, we physically clamp the channel capacity (C) to ≤ 1200 bits per second. We demonstrate through information theory that limiting the rate of information egress below the human cognitive processing threshold mathematically bounds the system's "Agency" (α), rendering high-velocity exfiltration, covert timing attacks, and real-time manipulation thermodynamically impossible.</p> |
| title | Physical-Layer Containment via Isochronous Governors: An Information-Theoretic Side-Channel Countermeasure |
| url | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18959911 |