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| Format: | Recurso digital |
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Zenodo
2026
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18991108 |
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Table of Contents:
- The doctrine of "deemed assent" emerged in Indian constitutional discourse as a judicially contemplated response to prolonged executive inaction, particularly in relation to the Governor's failure to grant or withhold assent to State legislation under Article 200 of the Constitution of India. Conceived as a mechanism to prevent democratic paralysis and protect legislative supremacy, the doctrine was grounded in broader constitutional values such as rule of law, reasonableness, and constitutional morality. However, the doctrine simultaneously raised profound concerns regarding separation of powers, federal balance, and the limits of judicial creativity. This paper undertakes a comprehensive doctrinal and theoretical analysis of the rise and fall of deemed assent in Indian constitutional jurisprudence. It argues that while judicial intervention was prompted by genuine constitutional necessity, the doctrine ultimately proved unsustainable due to its incompatibility with constitutional text and structure. The paper concludes that constitutional accountability must be enforced through interpretative discipline, time-bound directives, and institutional dialogue rather than judicial substitution of constitutionally designated,authorities.