Gespeichert in:
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| Format: | Recurso digital |
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Zenodo
2026
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| Online-Zugang: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19069650 |
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Inhaltsangabe:
- <p dir="auto"><strong>Why do voluntary collective contributions collapse even when everyone wants to cooperate?</strong></p> <p dir="auto"><strong>Structural answer (not preferences):</strong> the <strong>Structural Law of Collective Contribution (SLCC.T1)</strong> proves that sustained contribution C(t) ≥ c* is admissible <strong>only if three structural conditions hold simultaneously</strong>:</p> <ul> <li><strong>κ ≥ κ_min</strong> (structural buffer)</li> <li><strong>K > 0</strong> (kenotic plasticity)</li> <li><strong>Π > 0</strong> (pistis coherence)</li> </ul> <p dir="auto"><strong>Key novelties:</strong></p> <ul> <li>First formal derivation of ZLC (P72) into the public-goods domain</li> <li><strong>Three pure failure pathways</strong> that are exhaustive (CM-001 Idolatry, CM-002 Pharisee, CM-003 Atomization) — no fourth mode exists (P78)</li> <li><strong>Four ordinal falsifiable predictions</strong> (two novel)</li> <li><strong>Strong Grade A empirical support</strong> from four decades of VCM experiments (Herrmann 2008, Gürerk 2006, Ostrom, Dal Bó & Fréchette)</li> </ul> <p dir="auto"><strong>This is not a preference model. It is a structural law.</strong> Operational audit protocol <strong>IAS-COOP</strong> included (Appendix A).</p>