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| Format: | Recurso digital |
| Language: | English |
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2026
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19367797 |
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| _version_ | 1866902115891281920 |
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| author | Włodarczyk, Mariusz |
| author_facet | Włodarczyk, Mariusz |
| contents | <p><strong>Changelog note</strong></p> <p><strong>v0.1.1 - April 2026</strong><br><strong>Errata, terminological, and formatting corrections:</strong></p> <p>- Corrected Polish-language remnants in tables and body text (Sections 3.2, 5.2, 7.2, 10.1, 10.4, 13.2) - replaced with English equivalents.<br>- Section 6.1: Removed editorial meta-commentary from the MIT OCW [39] reference block. Replaced with a declarative statement clarifying that the model employs the odds form of Bayes' theorem, not generic "OR algebra." <strong>No change to the mathematical structure or results.</strong><br>- Formatting improvements throughout the document, including standardization of the References section (Section 17).</p> <p><strong>No numerical values, model variables, or conclusions have been altered.</strong></p> <p>***</p> <p>This analysis estimates the probability of tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) use by the US-Israel coalition in the ongoing conflict with Iran, employing a simplified Bayesian odds model with multiplicative OR multipliers for identified input variables. The baseline prior (3% at week 6) is combined with seven structural factors - including interceptor depletion, diversionary escalation, China/Russia signaling, and the Taiwan threat - yielding a raw estimate of 57%, subsequently revised to a realistic range of 25-55% (midpoint ~40%) after sensitivity analysis and red team review. <strong>The assessment identifies escalation mechanisms, trigger scenarios, falsification conditions with a verification schedule, and cascade effects including conditional probabilities of Russian tactical nuclear use in Ukraine (30-50%) and a full nuclear war chain (1-4%). I</strong>nhibiting factors are analyzed qualitatively as binary conditions rather than continuous modifiers<strong>. The document concludes that even conservative estimates place the risk at levels comparable to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and that the scenario cannot be dismissed as improbable. </strong>The primary value of the analysis lies in identifying variables, mechanisms, and update indicators rather than in specific percentages. This report constitutes an operational supplement to the War-Peace Validator module of the Triptych framework (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17219502).<br>This report was originally written in Polish; the English version is a translation.</p> |
| format | Recurso digital |
| id | zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_19367797 |
| institution | Zenodo |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| publisher | Zenodo |
| record_format | zenodo |
| spellingShingle | Probability of Tactical Nuclear Weapon Use in a US-Israeli Coalition Conflict with Iran: Assessment as of March 18, 2026 Włodarczyk, Mariusz nuclear risk assessment, tactical nuclear weapons, Iran conflict 2026, Bayesian odds model, escalation analysis, scenario analysis, nuclear taboo, proliferation risk, war-peace validation <p><strong>Changelog note</strong></p> <p><strong>v0.1.1 - April 2026</strong><br><strong>Errata, terminological, and formatting corrections:</strong></p> <p>- Corrected Polish-language remnants in tables and body text (Sections 3.2, 5.2, 7.2, 10.1, 10.4, 13.2) - replaced with English equivalents.<br>- Section 6.1: Removed editorial meta-commentary from the MIT OCW [39] reference block. Replaced with a declarative statement clarifying that the model employs the odds form of Bayes' theorem, not generic "OR algebra." <strong>No change to the mathematical structure or results.</strong><br>- Formatting improvements throughout the document, including standardization of the References section (Section 17).</p> <p><strong>No numerical values, model variables, or conclusions have been altered.</strong></p> <p>***</p> <p>This analysis estimates the probability of tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) use by the US-Israel coalition in the ongoing conflict with Iran, employing a simplified Bayesian odds model with multiplicative OR multipliers for identified input variables. The baseline prior (3% at week 6) is combined with seven structural factors - including interceptor depletion, diversionary escalation, China/Russia signaling, and the Taiwan threat - yielding a raw estimate of 57%, subsequently revised to a realistic range of 25-55% (midpoint ~40%) after sensitivity analysis and red team review. <strong>The assessment identifies escalation mechanisms, trigger scenarios, falsification conditions with a verification schedule, and cascade effects including conditional probabilities of Russian tactical nuclear use in Ukraine (30-50%) and a full nuclear war chain (1-4%). I</strong>nhibiting factors are analyzed qualitatively as binary conditions rather than continuous modifiers<strong>. The document concludes that even conservative estimates place the risk at levels comparable to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and that the scenario cannot be dismissed as improbable. </strong>The primary value of the analysis lies in identifying variables, mechanisms, and update indicators rather than in specific percentages. This report constitutes an operational supplement to the War-Peace Validator module of the Triptych framework (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17219502).<br>This report was originally written in Polish; the English version is a translation.</p> |
| title | Probability of Tactical Nuclear Weapon Use in a US-Israeli Coalition Conflict with Iran: Assessment as of March 18, 2026 |
| topic | nuclear risk assessment, tactical nuclear weapons, Iran conflict 2026, Bayesian odds model, escalation analysis, scenario analysis, nuclear taboo, proliferation risk, war-peace validation |
| url | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19367797 |