State Signals, Expectations, and Inefficiency in Higher Education: A Dynamic Framework
Fuente:
Zenodo
Salvato in:
| Autore principale: | |
|---|---|
| Natura: | Recurso digital |
| Pubblicazione: |
Zenodo
2026
|
| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | |
| Tags: |
Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!
|
| _version_ | 1866901737811476480 |
|---|---|
| author | Araar, Abdelkrim |
| author_facet | Araar, Abdelkrim |
| contents | <p>This paper develops a dynamic framework to analyze inefficiencies in higher education systems<br>arising from the interaction between state engagement and students’ expectations. We<br>argue that public budget planning and expansion policies act as implicit signals that shape<br>beliefs about the returns to education. When these signals are misaligned with underlying<br>labor market fundamentals, they induce systematic overqualification and skill mismatch. We<br>propose a formal model in which expectations depend jointly on economic returns and stategenerated<br>signals, demonstrating that rational individuals can make inefficient educational<br>choices under distorted informational environments. The paper contributes to human capital<br>literature by formalizing the State as an implicit signaling agent and highlighting that<br>policy focus should shift from pure systemic expansion toward the provision of transparent<br>labor market information.</p> |
| format | Recurso digital |
| id | zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_19536971 |
| institution | Zenodo |
| language | |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| publisher | Zenodo |
| record_format | zenodo |
| spellingShingle | State Signals, Expectations, and Inefficiency in Higher Education: A Dynamic Framework Araar, Abdelkrim State signals Expectations formation Skill mismatch Education policy <p>This paper develops a dynamic framework to analyze inefficiencies in higher education systems<br>arising from the interaction between state engagement and students’ expectations. We<br>argue that public budget planning and expansion policies act as implicit signals that shape<br>beliefs about the returns to education. When these signals are misaligned with underlying<br>labor market fundamentals, they induce systematic overqualification and skill mismatch. We<br>propose a formal model in which expectations depend jointly on economic returns and stategenerated<br>signals, demonstrating that rational individuals can make inefficient educational<br>choices under distorted informational environments. The paper contributes to human capital<br>literature by formalizing the State as an implicit signaling agent and highlighting that<br>policy focus should shift from pure systemic expansion toward the provision of transparent<br>labor market information.</p> |
| title | State Signals, Expectations, and Inefficiency in Higher Education: A Dynamic Framework |
| topic | State signals Expectations formation Skill mismatch Education policy |
| url | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19536971 |