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2026
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19600592 |
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| author | zhou, changzheng zhou, ziqing |
| author_facet | zhou, changzheng zhou, ziqing |
| contents | <p>Since Harsanyi’s transformation of games with incomplete information into<br>games with imperfect information, the common prior assumption has occupied<br>the epistemological core of mainstream game theory. However, when participants’<br>cognitive structures undergo endogenous evolution during interaction, the shared<br>measure space required by this assumption becomes operationally unattainable.<br>This paper rigorously distinguishes between the ontological interpretation and the<br>epistemological interpretation of the common prior, and demonstrates that the lat<br>ter cannot be confirmed or achieved by participants through finite interaction under<br>conditions of asynchronous evolution of cognitive algebras. The paper proposes and<br>proves the Incomparability of Interaction Theorem: when one participant refines<br>their event algebra by introducing new concepts, the beliefs of the interacting par<br>ties are no longer defined on comparable probability spaces, and any “common<br>prior” imposed by an external analyst degenerates into a theoretical construct de<br>void of operational significance. Furthermore, the paper reveals a systematic blind<br>spot of classical equilibrium analysis in the face of conceptual innovation—it can<br>characterize optimal responses within a given conceptual space, yet it cannot pre<br>dict the endogenous emergence of new strategic categories. As an alternative, the<br>paper proposes shifting the baseline description of games from shared probability<br>distributions to the coupled evolution of participants’ constraint networks, thereby<br>laying an epistemological foundation for the subsequent development of a theory<br>of structurally open games.</p> |
| format | Recurso digital |
| id | zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_19600592 |
| institution | Zenodo |
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| publishDate | 2026 |
| publisher | Zenodo |
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| spellingShingle | Post-Game Theory B: Beyond the Common Prior: The Structural Unattainability of a Shared World in Strategic Interactions zhou, changzheng zhou, ziqing CommonPriorAssumption; Structural Unattainability; Cognitive Structure Evolution; Constraint Network Coupling; Foundations of Game Theory <p>Since Harsanyi’s transformation of games with incomplete information into<br>games with imperfect information, the common prior assumption has occupied<br>the epistemological core of mainstream game theory. However, when participants’<br>cognitive structures undergo endogenous evolution during interaction, the shared<br>measure space required by this assumption becomes operationally unattainable.<br>This paper rigorously distinguishes between the ontological interpretation and the<br>epistemological interpretation of the common prior, and demonstrates that the lat<br>ter cannot be confirmed or achieved by participants through finite interaction under<br>conditions of asynchronous evolution of cognitive algebras. The paper proposes and<br>proves the Incomparability of Interaction Theorem: when one participant refines<br>their event algebra by introducing new concepts, the beliefs of the interacting par<br>ties are no longer defined on comparable probability spaces, and any “common<br>prior” imposed by an external analyst degenerates into a theoretical construct de<br>void of operational significance. Furthermore, the paper reveals a systematic blind<br>spot of classical equilibrium analysis in the face of conceptual innovation—it can<br>characterize optimal responses within a given conceptual space, yet it cannot pre<br>dict the endogenous emergence of new strategic categories. As an alternative, the<br>paper proposes shifting the baseline description of games from shared probability<br>distributions to the coupled evolution of participants’ constraint networks, thereby<br>laying an epistemological foundation for the subsequent development of a theory<br>of structurally open games.</p> |
| title | Post-Game Theory B: Beyond the Common Prior: The Structural Unattainability of a Shared World in Strategic Interactions |
| topic | CommonPriorAssumption; Structural Unattainability; Cognitive Structure Evolution; Constraint Network Coupling; Foundations of Game Theory |
| url | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19600592 |