When AML Breaks Settlement Finality: A Structural Analysis of Payment Systems Under Compliance Constraints
Fuente:
Zenodo
Guardado en:
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Recurso digital |
| Lenguaje: | inglés |
| Publicado: |
Zenodo
2026
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
| _version_ | 1866901463458906112 |
|---|---|
| author | Grundmann, Miloslav |
| author_facet | Grundmann, Miloslav |
| contents | <p>Modern payment systems are frequently described as enabling real-time and final settlement. While this description is technically accurate, it is regulatorily incomplete.<br>Anti-money laundering (AML), sanctions enforcement, and fraud prevention introduce a persistent possibility of post-execution intervention. As a result, the economic out-<br>come of a transaction remains uncertain even after its technical completion. This paper develops a structural framework distinguishing between execution and<br>compliance closure. It introduces the concept of conditional settlement finality and shows that it arises across all major payment architectures, including correspondent<br>banking, instant payment systems, and stablecoin-based infrastructures. The analysis demonstrates that improvements in execution speed do not eliminate uncertainty. In-stead, they relocate it into the compliance layer. Settlement finality is therefore not an intrinsic system property, but a contingent state dependent on the closure of regulatory processes.</p> |
| format | Recurso digital |
| id | zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_19868191 |
| institution | Zenodo |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| publisher | Zenodo |
| record_format | zenodo |
| spellingShingle | When AML Breaks Settlement Finality: A Structural Analysis of Payment Systems Under Compliance Constraints Grundmann, Miloslav Settlement finality AML compliance payment systems financial regulation operational risk sanctions stablecoins <p>Modern payment systems are frequently described as enabling real-time and final settlement. While this description is technically accurate, it is regulatorily incomplete.<br>Anti-money laundering (AML), sanctions enforcement, and fraud prevention introduce a persistent possibility of post-execution intervention. As a result, the economic out-<br>come of a transaction remains uncertain even after its technical completion. This paper develops a structural framework distinguishing between execution and<br>compliance closure. It introduces the concept of conditional settlement finality and shows that it arises across all major payment architectures, including correspondent<br>banking, instant payment systems, and stablecoin-based infrastructures. The analysis demonstrates that improvements in execution speed do not eliminate uncertainty. In-stead, they relocate it into the compliance layer. Settlement finality is therefore not an intrinsic system property, but a contingent state dependent on the closure of regulatory processes.</p> |
| title | When AML Breaks Settlement Finality: A Structural Analysis of Payment Systems Under Compliance Constraints |
| topic | Settlement finality AML compliance payment systems financial regulation operational risk sanctions stablecoins |
| url | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19868191 |