Carrier-Anchored Proof-of-Human: SIM-Bound Cryptographic Identity via 3GPP AKMA
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866901383947485184 |
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| author | Yashesh Bharti |
| author_facet | Yashesh Bharti |
| contents | <p>Proof-of-human verification has become a foundational requirement for digital systems as generative AI erodes the boundary between human-authored and machine-authored content. Existing approaches such as CAPTCHA, centralized biometric registries, and visual interaction puzzles face well-documented tradeoffs in robustness, privacy, and global reach. We present a proof-of-human protocol that derives application-scoped pseudonymous identifiers from 3GPP Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) session keys, binds them to the Subscriber Permanent Identifier (SUPI) so that any SIM swap or credential change automatically invalidates derived keys, and federates attestations across multiple independent authorities through a Global Human Identity Anchor (GHIA). The construction is privacy-preserving because cross-application identifiers are cryptographically unlinkable; it is fraud-resistant because revocation is cryptographic and automatic; and it is globally accessible because mobile network coverage already reaches more than 95 percent of the world's population. We describe the protocol, give a security analysis covering SIM-swap, replay, linkability, and Sybil attacks, and report on iOS and Android reference implementations. We further extend the framework to constrained IoT devices and to AI agent delegation scenarios in which a human user authorizes an agent to act on their behalf.</p> <p> </p> |
| format | Recurso digital |
| id | zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_20018638 |
| institution | Zenodo |
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| publishDate | 2026 |
| publisher | Zenodo |
| record_format | zenodo |
| spellingShingle | Carrier-Anchored Proof-of-Human: SIM-Bound Cryptographic Identity via 3GPP AKMA Yashesh Bharti proof-of-human AKMA 3GPP decentralized identity federated identity mobile authentication privacy-preserving cryptography <p>Proof-of-human verification has become a foundational requirement for digital systems as generative AI erodes the boundary between human-authored and machine-authored content. Existing approaches such as CAPTCHA, centralized biometric registries, and visual interaction puzzles face well-documented tradeoffs in robustness, privacy, and global reach. We present a proof-of-human protocol that derives application-scoped pseudonymous identifiers from 3GPP Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) session keys, binds them to the Subscriber Permanent Identifier (SUPI) so that any SIM swap or credential change automatically invalidates derived keys, and federates attestations across multiple independent authorities through a Global Human Identity Anchor (GHIA). The construction is privacy-preserving because cross-application identifiers are cryptographically unlinkable; it is fraud-resistant because revocation is cryptographic and automatic; and it is globally accessible because mobile network coverage already reaches more than 95 percent of the world's population. We describe the protocol, give a security analysis covering SIM-swap, replay, linkability, and Sybil attacks, and report on iOS and Android reference implementations. We further extend the framework to constrained IoT devices and to AI agent delegation scenarios in which a human user authorizes an agent to act on their behalf.</p> <p> </p> |
| title | Carrier-Anchored Proof-of-Human: SIM-Bound Cryptographic Identity via 3GPP AKMA |
| topic | proof-of-human AKMA 3GPP decentralized identity federated identity mobile authentication privacy-preserving cryptography |
| url | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20018638 |