Para-conditional determinism and and determined freedom
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| Natura: | Recurso digital |
| Lingua: | inglese |
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Zenodo
2026
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| _version_ | 1866902218731421696 |
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| author | Torgashin, Alexey |
| author_facet | Torgashin, Alexey |
| contents | <p>This monograph is devoted to a systematic destruction of the prejudices surrounding <<scientific determinism>> and to a defense of the compatibility of determinism with free will. The author shows that determinism in its strong, <<canceling>> formulation is internally contradictory and reduces to an allocentric theory that deactivates the efficacy of any factor by treating it as <<non-independent>> and as determined by anonymous causes in the <<infinitely remote past>>. Such determinism harms itself first, neutral reference of the object (its ability to be <<this rather than that>>) second, and only third — freedom. Drawing on an analysis of the concepts of J. Kim, R. Sapolsky, G. Strawson and others, the book proposes a model of <<para-conditional determinism>>: the observed state of affairs in a broad sense, which cannot accommodate within its signature metaphysical notions such as <<Every event has its own cause.>></p> <p>It is shown that the necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of an event cannot be that event's own (<<its own>>) cause; isomorphism of the type <<event-cause>> is impossible at the structural level. The work introduces the concept of hylomorphic properties (wholes irreducible to their parts) and demonstrates that freedom does not require a <<separate>> element — just as a television's ability to transmit an image is not localized in any specific semiconductor. Freedom is no more contradictory to causes than the existence of a thing is contradictory to the existence of the atoms of which it consists. Consequently, the idea that freedom and determinism are incompatible is nothing more than a cluster of future historical prejudices, whose content and cultural appropriateness descendants will understand only with difficulty.</p> <p>It is formally proved that the complete embodiment of an agent by external factors makes that agent completely free, and that epiphenomenal consciousness, when coinciding with physiology, becomes a monitoring system indistinguishable from the ideologically demanded free will. The conclusion is that observed empirical freedom is precisely the libertarians' genuine free will, but without the problem of dumb luck. </p> |
| format | Recurso digital |
| id | zenodo_https___doi_org_10_5281_zenodo_20400544 |
| institution | Zenodo |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| publisher | Zenodo |
| record_format | zenodo |
| spellingShingle | Para-conditional determinism and and determined freedom Torgashin, Alexey (4-(m-Chlorophenylcarbamoyloxy)-2-butynyl)trimethylammonium Chloride (4-(m-Chlorophenylcarbamoyloxy)-2-butynyl)trimethylammonium Chloride/agonists determinism free will compatibilism para-conditional determinism hylomorphism Laplace's demon Tarski's theorem Gödel's theorem epiphenomenon ostensive parameter J. Kim R. Sapolsky G. Strawson 6.3.1 6.3.2 6.3.6 <p>This monograph is devoted to a systematic destruction of the prejudices surrounding <<scientific determinism>> and to a defense of the compatibility of determinism with free will. The author shows that determinism in its strong, <<canceling>> formulation is internally contradictory and reduces to an allocentric theory that deactivates the efficacy of any factor by treating it as <<non-independent>> and as determined by anonymous causes in the <<infinitely remote past>>. Such determinism harms itself first, neutral reference of the object (its ability to be <<this rather than that>>) second, and only third — freedom. Drawing on an analysis of the concepts of J. Kim, R. Sapolsky, G. Strawson and others, the book proposes a model of <<para-conditional determinism>>: the observed state of affairs in a broad sense, which cannot accommodate within its signature metaphysical notions such as <<Every event has its own cause.>></p> <p>It is shown that the necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of an event cannot be that event's own (<<its own>>) cause; isomorphism of the type <<event-cause>> is impossible at the structural level. The work introduces the concept of hylomorphic properties (wholes irreducible to their parts) and demonstrates that freedom does not require a <<separate>> element — just as a television's ability to transmit an image is not localized in any specific semiconductor. Freedom is no more contradictory to causes than the existence of a thing is contradictory to the existence of the atoms of which it consists. Consequently, the idea that freedom and determinism are incompatible is nothing more than a cluster of future historical prejudices, whose content and cultural appropriateness descendants will understand only with difficulty.</p> <p>It is formally proved that the complete embodiment of an agent by external factors makes that agent completely free, and that epiphenomenal consciousness, when coinciding with physiology, becomes a monitoring system indistinguishable from the ideologically demanded free will. The conclusion is that observed empirical freedom is precisely the libertarians' genuine free will, but without the problem of dumb luck. </p> |
| title | Para-conditional determinism and and determined freedom |
| topic | (4-(m-Chlorophenylcarbamoyloxy)-2-butynyl)trimethylammonium Chloride (4-(m-Chlorophenylcarbamoyloxy)-2-butynyl)trimethylammonium Chloride/agonists determinism free will compatibilism para-conditional determinism hylomorphism Laplace's demon Tarski's theorem Gödel's theorem epiphenomenon ostensive parameter J. Kim R. Sapolsky G. Strawson 6.3.1 6.3.2 6.3.6 |
| url | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20400544 |